No Influence Act
Legislative counsel memorandum and implementation dossier
November 1, 2026 | Accompanies the federal discussion draft | Not part of the bill
1. Overview and drafting assumptions
The accompanying No Influence Act is a complete federal model bill organized into 20 titles and 206 sections. It creates targeted new prohibitions, amends selected existing statutes, funds implementation, and establishes judicial and independent oversight. It is a discussion draft for legislative consideration, not an introduced bill, enacted law, official congressional product, or certification by a chamber's legislative counsel.
The short title is intentionally not the operative legal standard. Lawful international advocacy, commerce, diplomacy, scientific exchange, immigration, journalism, and personal association remain permitted. Liability turns on defined conduct, actual direction or control, material deception, prohibited financing, unlawful access, coercion, or another specified element. The draft does not claim that every foreign relationship is dangerous or that every identifiable loophole can be eliminated by one enactment.
The model uses United States federal jurisdiction, a general 180-day prospective commencement for new offenses, longer implementation periods for systems-dependent duties, new direct appropriations, annual reporting, and a five-year comprehensive review. Country-specific enhanced restrictions require evidence and individualized process. Offenses involving covert operations or repression apply to conduct connected to any foreign government, including an allied government; no favorable-country defense is created.
Existing federal systems are retained rather than replaced by a single security agency. DOJ leads criminal enforcement and most civil litigation; the FEC retains primary election-finance jurisdiction; Treasury leads financial and investment functions; CISA leads assigned cyber functions; Education and research agencies administer award controls; and existing courts, inspectors general, GAO, and PCLOB provide review. The Council coordinates administration, not prosecutions or adjudicatory outcomes.
What the draft changes most substantially
The draft adds an evidence-based foreign-state coercion framework; stronger concealed foreign-state agency and trusted-access offenses; large-scheme electoral penalties; targeted ownership reporting; data-transfer, advertising, and privileged-access controls; enforceable investment mitigation; institutional research verification; foreign-state representational cooling-off rules; and funding for enforcement, victims, and independent oversight. It directs punitive monetary cases to federal court instead of creating a general administrative penalty tribunal.
The draft is broader than a FARA amendment. FARA disclosure, criminal foreign-government agency, election financing, commercial data security, procurement responsibility, and intelligence collection remain distinct legal systems. This separation avoids turning a missed filing into an espionage conviction or treating an intelligence assessment as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Verified baseline and treatment of prior research
Earlier narrative research is not treated as a substitute for enacted text. The bill's amendments were checked against the relevant statutory provisions, and new supplemental duties are written independently where wholesale amendment would risk silently altering an existing framework. Core statutory anchors include FARA, 22 U.S.C. 611-621; 18 U.S.C. 951 and 219; 52 U.S.C. 30121; 31 U.S.C. 5336; 20 U.S.C. 1011f; and 15 U.S.C. 9901. [1-7]
The baseline is date-sensitive. Treasury announced a 2026 final rule retaining the exemption of domestically created entities from Corporate Transparency Act reporting. Title VI therefore creates an independent, targeted reporting duty for enumerated sensitive activities; it does not incorrectly assume all domestic entities already report beneficial ownership, nor does it restore universal historical CTA coverage. This is a deliberate scope choice, not an assertion that targeted reporting will detect every shell entity. [8]
The DOJ Data Security Program and the Protecting Americans' Data from Foreign Adversaries Act already regulate important data transactions. Title VIII supplements rather than narrows those restrictions, preserves independently broader prohibitions, and supplies specific due-process and compliance duties. Existing thresholds and exemptions are not silently replaced by the draft's additional standards. [7,9]
Treasury's October 2026 outbound-investment materials distinguish the new COINS statutory framework and proposed implementing rules from rules already operating. Title X requires coordination without treating a proposal as final law. Similarly, title V supplies its own ballot-measure amendment rather than assuming that H.R. 3535 has already become law. The official referred-to-Senate version of that bill is a proposal, not proof of enactment. [10-11]
The draft does not rely on a blanket statement about the continued availability of FISA section 702. Section 1604 expressly does not enact, extend, revive, or enlarge section 702 or another expired authority. Independently valid orders and collection remain governed by their own statutes. Any future decision to reauthorize a surveillance authority requires separate, explicit legislative treatment.
GAO's research-security work supports more than a demand for additional punishment: it identifies the importance of tailored fraud-risk assessment and evaluating safeguards against discriminatory implementation. The draft therefore combines verification with materiality, correction, appeal, and independent assessment. GAO investment and agricultural-land reviews likewise support stronger monitoring and data quality, not a conclusion that every foreign investment is unlawful. [12-15]
The legal source review is substantial but not a certified, exhaustive fifty-state or every-regulation concordance. Public source availability, pending litigation, new enactments, and changing rules require an updating check immediately before introduction. The accompanying text is a new legislative proposal, not a representation that all its provisions reflect existing law.
Title I: General provisions (sections 101-110)
Sections 101-102 establish purposes and the operative vocabulary, including knowing agency arrangements, governmental control, covered elections, sensitive data, and materiality. Sections 103-108 establish neutral application, mental-state rules, jurisdiction, coordination with existing law, assigned administration, and anti-evasion limits. Section 109 creates renewable evidence-based enhanced-risk designations; section 110 protects constitutional institutions, State and Tribal sovereignty, and applicable immunity.
Drafting significance: a foreign IP address, surname, independent political view, or unrestricted grant is not a conclusive indicator of state control. A designation creates only expressly specified preventive consequences and does not establish criminal guilt or automatically freeze property. Temporary designation, final designation, sanctions, and criminal prosecution have distinct procedures.
Title II: Coordination and capacity (sections 201-208)
Sections 201-204 create a coordination council, a public strategy, responsible agency plans, referral deadlines, trained teams, and independent legal review. Sections 205-208 address reporting, lawful information sharing, oversight reporting, and accessible compliance services. The council cannot run an independent intelligence collection service or direct a court or commission to reach an outcome.
Drafting significance: fragmentation is treated as an operational problem as well as a statutory one. Referral deadlines require accountability without compelling prosecution. Unsupported allegations remain marked as unverified rather than gaining credibility by circulation.
Title III: FARA and foreign representation (sections 301-312)
Sections 301 and 304 expressly amend the lobbying-disclosure exemption and periodic reporting. Sections 302-303 reach actual intermediaries and supplemental representation at subnational levels with a federal nexus. Sections 305-308 govern source notices, legitimate exemptions, registry safety, and prospective advisory opinions. Sections 309-312 provide narrow investigative demands, civil remedies, a deliberate concealed-state-principal offense, and implementation.
Drafting significance: genuine independent commercial representation is not automatically converted into espionage. The ten-year offense addresses deliberate state-principal concealment with specified deceptive conduct, not every late registrant. The enhanced transparency regime does not require public residential addresses or privileged legal advice. FARA's existing independent scope is preserved except where expressly amended. [1-2]
Title IV: Covert operations and serious offenses (sections 401-410)
Sections 401-405 define offenses involving covert foreign-state operations, aggravated trusted-access recruitment, sabotage, trade-secret theft, and coercive recruitment. Sections 406-410 address attempt, conspiracy, purposeful facilitation, obstruction, protected reporting, charging review, sentencing, and prospective effect.
Drafting significance: most new serious offenses carry maxima between 10 and 25 years, with 30 years or life reserved for specified aggravated injury or death. Life imprisonment is not a general foreign-agent penalty. Existing espionage statutes remain independently applicable. The draft creates neither a mandatory minimum nor a new death penalty. Actual offense elements, not a headline characterization, govern punishment.
Title V: Electoral independence (sections 501-514)
Section 501 expressly extends the foreign-source prohibition to qualifying State and local ballot measures and recalls. Sections 502-507 address indirect financing, corporate decision-making, verification, nonprofit intermediaries, digital assets, and foreign services. Sections 508-510 address credible prohibited offers, fraudulent impersonation of election officials, and voluntary security assistance. Sections 511-514 provide judicial review of FEC inaction, a limited DOJ backstop, aggravated concealed-financing penalties, election-period safeguards, and savings.
Drafting significance: ownership and actual financing or decision-making are distinguished. Citizens, nationals, and lawful permanent residents retain their applicable electoral rights. Genuine issue discussion is not generally criminalized. The DOJ backstop requires a court order and failure to conform; it is not an unrestricted executive takeover of campaign-finance enforcement. This title has meaningful litigation risk, especially concerning ballot-measure spending and certain disclosure obligations. [3,16]
Title VI: Financial and ownership transparency (sections 601-610)
Sections 601-603 define targeted sensitive-activity coverage, full ownership chains, and the independent reporting obligation. Sections 604-607 address nominees, financial due diligence, trust structures, confidentiality, and lawful access. Sections 608-610 provide corrections, a purposeful financing offense, and review.
Drafting significance: reporting follows a specified transactional or operational nexus rather than every domestic entity or every private donor. Nominee filings must identify actual control. The regime still carries measurable implementation costs and cannot eliminate the evidentiary difficulty of offshore concealment. Unrelated charitable donor identities remain outside a generalized public registry. [4,8,18]
Title VII: Paid communications and digital impersonation (sections 701-710)
Sections 701-704 establish coverage thresholds, purchaser verification, advertising records, and disclosure of genuinely commissioned influence. Sections 705-707 distinguish actionable impersonation and synthetic paid depictions from protected expression and constrain government pressure on platforms. Sections 708-710 preserve communications-law roles and support proportionate auditing and independent research.
Drafting significance: this is not a general misinformation law. Independent journalism and ordinary users do not acquire a universal identification obligation. Regulators may not threaten unrelated adverse action to induce suppression of lawful speech. Source labels must describe sponsorship rather than brand a speaker disloyal. [19]
Title VIII: Sensitive data (sections 801-810)
Sections 801-805 establish supplemental prohibitions, restricted arrangements, broker due diligence, and limited exceptions. Sections 806-808 govern incident notice, technical validation, and transaction review. Sections 809-810 distinguish civil compliance from intentional assistance to a felony and preserve stronger privacy protections.
Drafting significance: contracts cannot substitute for actual access controls. A 20-year maximum requires knowing prohibited access and intent to facilitate a specified serious offense. Ordinary security mistakes do not meet that criminal standard. Health, humanitarian, research, and routine business exceptions remain bounded by purpose and data minimization. [7,9]
Title IX: Cybersecurity and privileged access (sections 901-910)
Sections 901-905 address function-based covered operators, minimum controls, incident reporting, identity fraud, and supply chains. Sections 906-910 protect authorized testing, constrain emergency intervention, preserve evidence, graduate civil liability, and phase in requirements.
Drafting significance: the 72-hour incident and 24-hour ransom framework is an independent proposed duty with harmonization provisions. It does not depend on asserting that every implementing rule of another reporting statute is already final. Operators are not strictly criminally liable for being attacked despite reasonable controls. No offensive hacking authority is created.
Title X: Investment, land, and strategic dependency (sections 1001-1010)
Sections 1001-1004 coordinate with CFIUS and add targeted notifications, sensitive-site controls, and better agricultural information. Sections 1005-1007 address enforceable mitigation, outbound-investment coordination, and dependencies. Sections 1008-1010 govern review, transition, innocent interests, evaluation, and expiration of sensitive-site zones.
Drafting significance: restrictions must connect actual rights or access to a security risk. Existing CFIUS review limits are not silently rewritten. A foreign-born homeowner is not presumed dangerous. Mitigation monitoring, correction, and current evidence matter as much as the initial transaction decision. [10,14-15]
Title XI: Research and education (sections 1101-1110)
Sections 1101-1102 add a $50,000 supplemental threshold for defined foreign-state or designated-source support and review of restrictive agreements. Sections 1103-1105 establish common material disclosures, risk-based verification, and protection of fundamental research. Sections 1106-1110 address proportionate remedies, campus safety, grant intermediaries, assistance, and transition.
Drafting significance: the current general section 117 threshold is not globally replaced. Targeted supplemental reporting coexists with existing requirements. Deliberate misconduct is separated from institutional errors, and unrelated student aid cannot be terminated under the draft as collateral punishment. Academic disagreement is not an award-disqualification criterion. [5,12-13]
Title XII: Public service and procurement (sections 1201-1210)
Section 1201 raises the existing section 219 maximum from two to five years and disciplines special-employee certifications. Sections 1202-1204 address conflicts, a five-year compensated foreign-state representational cooling-off period, and commissioned advice. Sections 1205-1208 address ownership, privileged personnel, debarment, and facilities. Sections 1209-1210 preserve voluntary subnational participation and contract transition.
Drafting significance: the cooling-off restriction is limited to compensated contacts seeking Federal action for a foreign state; it is not a general prohibition on employment or public political speech. No new constitutional qualification or automatic removal from elected office is created. Debarment requires present-responsibility findings and review. [6]
Title XIII: Transnational repression (sections 1301-1312)
Sections 1301-1304 define coercion, threats against relatives, unlawful data acquisition supporting repression, and unauthorized foreign policing. Section 1305 safeguards against abusive international requests. Sections 1306-1308 establish victim support, safety planning, and individualized treatment of coerced participants. Sections 1309-1312 address retaliation, protective orders, international cooperation, and review.
Drafting significance: protection on American soil is not limited to citizens. Assistance does not require a conviction or service as an informant. Immigration relief is neither automatically granted nor withdrawn by this Act. The draft distinguishes a credible threat, a criminal conviction, a sanctions finding, and a protective order. These are different legal determinations with different burdens and remedies. [20]
Title XIV: Subnational and civic resilience (sections 1401-1408)
Sections 1401-1403 govern voluntary government and election-security assistance. Sections 1404-1406 protect civic organizations, truthful public education, and Tribal sovereignty. Sections 1407-1408 support small entities, auditing, and proportionate recovery.
Drafting significance: grants cannot covertly compel State officials to run a Federal enforcement program. Federal personnel do not acquire authority to take ballots or change election results. Community providers are not conscripted into intelligence collection, and assistance cannot be conditioned on political agreement.
Title XV: Targeted economic and diplomatic responses (sections 1501-1508)
Sections 1501-1503 create conduct-based sanctions, procedural limits, licenses, and humanitarian safeguards. Sections 1504-1505 preserve existing immigration and diplomatic rules while supporting evidence cooperation. Sections 1506-1508 define willful sanctions evasion, reporting, periodic review, and termination.
Drafting significance: blocking is not confiscation. A sanctions decision does not remove sovereign immunity, transfer ownership, or establish criminal guilt. Countrywide embargoes and military action are not authorized. The Act's independent sanctions authority is narrow rather than contingent on a newly declared emergency.
Title XVI: Investigation and privacy (sections 1601-1612)
Sections 1601-1603 require predication, particularized demands, and ordinary search process. Sections 1604-1605 prevent implicit surveillance reauthorization and warrant circumvention through purchased data. Sections 1606-1608 address preservation, privilege, journalism, classified information, and fair trial. Sections 1609-1612 regulate retention, automated analysis, emergencies, detention, and military limits.
Drafting significance: new funding is not new surveillance authority. Agencies cannot buy a dataset merely to bypass process that would be required to compel the same information. Classified evidence cannot remove the Government's burden or constitutionally required contest. Automated tools assist accountable humans rather than assign loyalty scores.
Title XVII: Enforcement and remedies (sections 1701-1712)
Sections 1701-1704 establish court-based punitive enforcement, culpability, notice, tiered ceilings, and equitable relief. Sections 1705-1709 address restitution, criminal forfeiture, narrowly limited private claims, duplicate punishment, and organizational remedies. Sections 1710-1712 govern limitation periods, venue, and sentencing review.
Drafting significance: the strongest civil ceiling is available only for defined aggravated conduct. Four percent refers to attributable United States line-of-business revenue, not automatically worldwide turnover. Courts must consider proportionality. A common scheme cannot be multiplied into a penalty for every impression or record. The judicial route responds to Seventh Amendment risks highlighted by Jarkesy without claiming that every existing administrative penalty system is unconstitutional. [17]
Title XVIII: Rights and independent review (sections 1801-1810)
Sections 1801-1805 preserve protected freedoms, proof standards, judicial review, meaningful contest, and emergency relief. Sections 1806-1810 expand PCLOB oversight for these programs, permit defined remedies for government misuse, criminalize intentional malicious misuse of protected records, and require independent and public assessment.
Drafting significance: the Act supplies remedies against government abuse, not only penalties against private actors. The narrow damages waiver addresses proved actual loss from willful misuse, not an unlimited personal-capacity liability system. Existing exclusive forums for immigration, procurement, personnel, and FISA remain distinct.
Title XIX: Implementation (sections 1901-1908)
Sections 1901-1903 sequence implementation and define grant distribution. Sections 1904-1906 govern secure technology, civil-service staffing, grant records, and appeals. Sections 1907-1908 require defensible evaluation and corrective action.
Drafting significance: election grants use a defined base-share and population formula, with specific pass-through and voluntary Tribal provisions. CISA grants reserve direct local and Tribal access. Program success is not measured merely by arrests or registrations. A new interoperable filing system must not become a universal political dossier.
Title XX: Funding and legal transition (sections 2001-2010)
Sections 2001-2005 provide direct appropriations, allocations, fiscal controls, and reporting. Sections 2006-2010 prescribe rulemaking, savings, effective dates, severability, and review.
Drafting significance: the money is appropriated in the bill, not merely authorized for a later Congress to decide. Future fiscal-year amounts cannot be obligated before their availability date. Funding stops after ten program years unless Congress acts again; the substantive laws do not automatically disappear. Severe penalties do not attach before the operative duty and legally sufficient notice exist.
4. Legal and constitutional stress test
Authority and federalism
The strongest foundations are foreign and interstate commerce, protection of Federal institutions and spending, congressional-election authority, and necessary-and-proper legislation implementing enumerated powers. Every criminal application must satisfy an express nexus. Local and Tribal grant participation is voluntary, with conditions tied to the new funded program. The bill does not assert unlimited national jurisdiction merely because a dispute has an international dimension.
Residual risk: applications to State ballot measures, local governmental advocacy, and geographically sensitive real property require careful analysis of the precise nexus and the interaction with State powers. The drafting deliberately preserves independent Federal-election applications and makes ballot-measure applications severable. A committee should request an introduction-stage constitutional memorandum on those applications, not rely on findings alone.
Speech, association, and source disclosure
Factual sponsorship disclosure is generally more targeted than suppressing views, but it still burdens expression and association. The draft requires an actual accepted relationship, limits disclosure to the relevant activity, protects unrelated donors, includes safety exemptions, and preserves privileged legal and academic functions. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta warns against untailored collection of sensitive donor information. NRA v. Vullo underscores the danger of coercive government pressure on intermediaries. [18-19]
Residual risk: paid-advertising archives, synthetic-depiction labels, certain intermediary disclosures, and the five-year cooling-off rule can still face substantial First Amendment challenges. The chosen thresholds and duration are legislative judgments, not judicially guaranteed safe harbors. A narrower duration or higher threshold could reduce burdens but would leave more activity outside the new regime.
The Supreme Court's January 2025 TikTok decision concerns a particular statute and record. It should not be generalized into authority to prohibit all foreign-connected media or advocacy. This draft does not enact a universal platform divestiture rule or a viewpoint-based media ban. It addresses paid sponsorship, access, unlawful impersonation, and specified transactions instead. [21]
Residual risk: even a conduct-focused rule may burden a platform's or publisher's editorial choices in application. Implementation must maintain the distinction between an advertiser's purchased communication and independent editorial content, and between a commercial data transaction and protected publication.
Punishment, process, and the jury
The draft places new punitive civil penalties in Article III courts, preserves jury rights where applicable, specifies escalating culpability, limits aggregation, and requires particularized findings. Criminal penalties require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and are prospective. Higher statutory maxima provide discretion; they do not prove that harsher sentences will improve deterrence. Jarkesy is an important reason to avoid casually assigning common-law-like punitive claims to administrative adjudication. [17]
Residual risk: forfeiture, revenue-linked penalties, and extensive combined sanctions may still be disproportionate in an individual case. The Excessive Fines Clause and ordinary sentencing law remain operative. No legislative recital can eliminate that review.
Search, intelligence, and secrecy
The draft creates no general interception, bulk collection, detention, military-policing, or hacking power. New civil demands remain court-enforceable and privilege-limited. Existing FISA authorities require their own operative legal basis. Agency purchase of sensitive information cannot be used under this Act to bypass equivalent judicial process. Fair-trial obligations survive classification and foreign-partner confidentiality demands.
Residual risk: the practical adequacy of an unclassified summary, a protective order, a dataset query rule, or a source-protection method can only be assessed in context. When no constitutionally adequate substitute exists, the Government may have to forgo evidence or lose the action.
Property, sanctions, immunity, and foreign relations
Targeted blocking, investment mitigation, and debarment require different authority and process. The draft keeps those systems distinct, provides renewals and review, and preserves applicable diplomatic and sovereign immunity. A foreign government's displeasure or failure to cooperate does not itself authorize confiscation or detention.
Residual risk: presidential review limitations in existing CFIUS law, foreign sovereign immunity, just-compensation claims, treaty obligations, and overseas enforceability remain significant. The draft does not pretend to solve extradition or access to evidence simply by increasing a maximum sentence.
5. Fiscal note: enacted proposal and uncertainty
This is an author-designed funding schedule, not a CBO score, agency budget request, or estimate derived from demonstrated program demand. The proposal supplies $600 million in immediate startup authority and $3 billion in each of ten program fiscal years. Program fiscal year 1 begins with the first Federal fiscal year starting after enactment. Startup plus the first program year is a planning window, not a claim that all spending occurs within the first twelve calendar months.
Supplied memorandum fiscal table
| Recipient | Annual $m | Allocation note |
| Department of Justice | 1,000 | 600 FBI; 180 NSD; 80 USAOs; 140 victims and services |
| CISA | 600 | Includes 200 in State, local, and Tribal grants |
| Treasury | 450 | 200 FinCEN; 150 CFIUS; 100 sanctions |
| Election Assistance Commission | 250 | Grant pool after administration cap |
| Federal Election Commission | 75 | Enforcement, systems, and staff |
| Commerce | 75 | Technical, export, and investment coordination |
| Federal Trade Commission | 50 | Broker and advertising implementation |
| Education / NSF / HHS | 175 | 50 / 75 / 50 for research and education |
| State | 100 | International and diplomatic functions |
| Agriculture | 50 | AFIDA and coordination |
| Federal judiciary | 50 | Judicial support and secure evidence |
| Independent oversight | 125 | GAO, inspectors general, PCLOB, OSC |
| ANNUAL TOTAL | 3,000 | Fixed nominal dollars; ten program years |
The annual allocations sum to $3 billion. DOJ includes $140 million for victim protection and related services; CISA includes a $200 million State, local, and Tribal grant reservation. EAC may use no more than five percent for administration and evaluation before allocating its grant pool. Oversight funding is separately assigned rather than left to the discretion of the agencies being reviewed.
Supplied memorandum fiscal table
| Window | Recurring authority | Startup | Enacted total |
| 1 program year | $3.0bn | $0.6bn | $3.6bn |
| 5 program years | $15.0bn | $0.6bn | $15.6bn |
| 10 program years | $30.0bn | $0.6bn | $30.6bn |
| 30 program years | $30.0bn | $0.6bn | $30.6bn |
For the 30-year enacted-law column, no new recurring appropriation is supplied after year 10. The remaining legal duties require other available appropriations or future congressional action. A hypothetical continuation at a flat nominal $3 billion per year would produce $90.6 billion of budget authority over 30 program years including startup. That is a scenario, not money appropriated by this bill. Inflation indexing of recurring funding is not enacted.
Budget authority is not outlays. Startup funding remains available for its specified period, and annual appropriations generally remain available for three fiscal years. Actual cash spending depends on hiring, procurement, grants, and obligations. Debt-service costs, macroeconomic effects, and any spending under independently existing statutes require separate analysis.
The draft contains no revenue increase or offset. Relative to a baseline without these appropriations, the proposal increases federal spending authority. Fines, forfeitures, avoided espionage losses, and hypothetical economic growth are not assumed to pay for the program. Collections are uncertain and generally deposited under existing law rather than automatically recycled into agency budgets.
Sensitivity and missing cost evidence
As a workload-planning sensitivity, annual required capacity at 75, 100, and 125 percent of the proposed recurring level would be $2.25 billion, $3 billion, and $3.75 billion. Across ten program years plus the fixed startup amount, those planning cases total $23.1 billion, $30.6 billion, and $38.1 billion. Only the middle figure is enacted in the draft. These are arithmetic workload scenarios, not statistical confidence intervals, inflation forecasts, or alternative statutory appropriations.
Private compliance burdens include identity and control verification, legal advice, recordkeeping, advertising archives, security audits, contract modifications, and appeals. Costs will vary sharply by scale and exposure. No reliable aggregate estimate is supplied. Common filing, objective thresholds, transition periods, small-entity assistance, and materiality rules are intended to reduce burden but require testing.
A formal score should estimate agency full-time-equivalent positions, hiring ramps, court and defense costs, technology lifecycle costs, security audits, grant take-up, overseas evidence expense, victim demand, baseline overlap, and timing of cash outlays. CBO and the relevant budget committees would determine official treatment and any applicable budget-enforcement consequences.
6. Implementation roadmap and failure controls
First 90 days
Name accountable implementation officials, create the council secretariat, complete the startup plans, inventory existing systems and authorities, begin privacy design, and identify priority staffing. Do not procure a centralized database before defining lawful purposes and access boundaries. Startup funds permit preparation, not accelerated prosecution under a future effective date.
Months 3-6
Publish proposed rules and draft forms, open technical-assistance channels, establish interagency referral protocols, identify victim-service providers, and build training. Test whether an ordinary small organization can determine coverage without a costly bespoke legal opinion. Document unresolved statutory questions rather than silently resolving them through unpublished guidance.
Months 6-12
Commence only legally effective offenses and duties, finalize systems-dependent rules on schedule, validate registry security, test appeals, and prepare common reporting interfaces. New reporting and control duties receive the longer dates specified in their titles and section 2008. Existing prohibitions remain enforceable throughout transition.
Year 2
Complete legacy onboarding, review access logs and source-control accuracy, publish initial PCLOB assessment, and examine whether victims and small entities can actually obtain assistance. Audit the first civil cases for materiality, proportionality, adequate notice, and duplicate enforcement. Measure corrected errors as well as detected violations.
Years 3-5
Complete GAO and inspector-general evaluations, reassess sensitive-site zones and designations, review investment mitigation, and compare staffing and technology costs with actual workload. Correct burdens and false positives as actively as enforcement failures. Prepare the five-year report with changes requiring legislation clearly separated from administrative improvements.
Long-term review
Require reauthorization of future funding rather than assume unlimited continuation. Retain periodic designation expiration and emergency limits. Reassess whether thresholds, secrecy procedures, scientific collaboration safeguards, victim access, and new technologies create actual gaps. A new technology does not automatically justify a new criminal offense.
7. Stakeholders, incentives, and foreseeable effects
Intended beneficiaries include residents threatened by foreign states, public institutions, legitimate campaign participants, research recipients, sensitive-sector businesses, and individuals whose data could enable coercion. Potentially regulated entities include agents, political committees, covered intermediaries, major advertising services, data brokers, sensitive contractors, investors, educational institutions, and public personnel in defined roles.
Campaigns and small nonprofits will value clear eligibility rules but may face verification costs. Universities will value protection against nationality-based suspicion but may challenge new reporting scope and funding conditions. Technology and financial firms may support harmonization while opposing uncertain liability, extensive recordkeeping, or public disclosure of commercial relationships. Civil-liberties organizations are likely to scrutinize speech burdens, secrecy, and collection incentives. None of these positions should be assumed universal within a stakeholder group.
Agencies gain resources but also explicit timelines, court-based penalty processes, and review obligations. States and Tribes retain voluntary participation and may prefer direct technical support to complex grants. Victim advocates may seek broader eligibility or emergency flexibility; due-process advocates may seek more demanding proof before restrictions. The draft addresses these tensions through different pathways rather than a single undifferentiated security designation.
Possible unintended effects include defensive overreporting, financial de-risking of legitimate diaspora communities, delayed scientific partnerships, reduced procurement competition, increased enforcement litigation, and politicized accusations. The draft responds with exclusions, correction rights, objective criteria, neutral funding, oversight, and anti-retaliation rules. These safeguards reduce risk; they cannot guarantee implementation will never be abused.
8. Public explanation and frequently asked questions
Does “No Influence” ban foreign ideas or international relationships?
No. The title is shorthand. The operative provisions target specified unlawful conduct and defined disclosure or security duties. Independent opinions, lawful international business, cultural exchange, research, and journalism remain protected.
Does a foreign-agent registration mean someone is a spy?
No. Registration is a transparency obligation. Criminal agency, espionage, election-finance evasion, and coercion require separate elements. The bill requires public records to distinguish allegations from final findings.
Are allied governments exempt?
No. Core conduct prohibitions are neutral as to which foreign state directs the activity. Enhanced restrictions require evidence-based designation, and sanctions require a separate finding. An ally is not categorically exempt; an entire nationality is not categorically guilty.
What becomes more punitive?
The proposal raises the existing federal-official foreign-agent maximum to five years, adds higher penalties for defined concealed-state operations and large deliberate financing schemes, and creates serious coercion, sabotage, and data-facilitation offenses. Defined aggravated cases can support substantial revenue-linked civil penalties, restitution, forfeiture, sanctions, and debarment, with separate process for each remedy.
Can the government censor people or spy without a warrant under this bill?
The bill supplies no general censorship or warrantless surveillance authority. It expressly limits coercive platform contacts, preserves search and intelligence law, and constrains purchase of sensitive data to evade required judicial process. Courts retain responsibility for constitutional review.
Will the bill pay for itself?
No such claim is made. It proposes $30.6 billion in direct budget authority over startup and ten program fiscal years without an enacted offset. Benefits, private costs, cash outlays, and debt-service effects require further scoring and evaluation.
Is this ready to be represented as an introduced congressional bill?
No. It is a complete substantive discussion draft in congressional bill format. Introduction requires a sponsor, chamber processing, a current-law concordance, committee and budget review, and formal legislative-counsel checking. No bill number or sponsor has been invented.
9. Source register
The sources below identify the principal legal and evidentiary anchors. Proposed requirements, thresholds, allocations, and policy judgments in the draft are the author's design and are not attributed to these sources as existing law. Primary federal statutes and decisions control over summaries. Verification date: November 1, 2026.
[1] Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. 611-621; statutory definitions, disclosure, and exemptions.
Related provisions checked: sections 612, 613, and 618.
Official source: uscode.house.gov
[2] 18 U.S.C. 951, Agents of foreign governments.
Criminal notification, direction or control, and statutory exceptions.
Official source: uscode.house.gov
[3] 52 U.S.C. 30121, Contributions and donations by foreign nationals.
Existing election-finance baseline and foreign-national definition.
Official source: uscode.house.gov
[4] 31 U.S.C. 5336, Beneficial ownership information reporting requirements.
Statutory ownership, reporting, and access architecture; read with source 8.
Official source: uscode.house.gov
[5] 20 U.S.C. 1011f, Disclosures of foreign gifts.
Section 117 institutional reporting baseline.
Official source: uscode.house.gov
[6] 18 U.S.C. 219, Officers and employees acting as agents of foreign principals.
Two-year existing maximum and special-government-employee certification.
Official source: uscode.house.gov
[7] Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024.
Statutory reference and enforcement context for 15 U.S.C. 9901.
Official source: www.ftc.gov
[8] Department of the Treasury, 2026 announcement of final beneficial-ownership reporting rule.
Domestic-entity exemption; proposal uses a separate targeted reporting duty.
Official source: home.treasury.gov
[9] Department of Justice, Data Security Program.
Program under 28 C.F.R. part 202; effective April 8, 2025, with phased obligations.
Official source: www.justice.gov
[10] Department of the Treasury, Outbound Investment Program.
COINS Act and October 2026 proposed-rule transition; proposal is not treated as a final regulation.
Official source: home.treasury.gov
[11] H.R. 3535, 119th Congress, referred-in-Senate version, July 14, 2026.
Stop Foreign Funds in Elections Act; legislative proposal, not cited as enacted law.
Official source: www.govinfo.gov
[12] GAO-27-107848, Research Security: NIH Action Needed to Strengthen Foreign Interference Risk Management, October 2026.
Program-specific risk assessment and verification findings.
Official source: www.gao.gov
[13] GAO-26-107544, federal research-security safeguards assessment, January 2026.
Evaluation of safeguards against discriminatory implementation.
Official source: www.gao.gov
[14] GAO-24-107358, Foreign Investment in the U.S.: Efforts to Mitigate National Security Risks Can Be Strengthened, April 2024.
CFIUS mitigation and oversight findings; implementation status can change.
Official source: www.gao.gov
[15] GAO-24-106337, Foreign Investments in U.S. Agricultural Land, January 2024.
Data quality and timely interagency sharing; not an assertion that all recommendations remain open.
Official source: www.gao.gov
[16] Federal Election Commission, Foreign nationals.
Official guidance on prohibited financing and decision-making, including domestic subsidiaries.
Official source: www.fec.gov
[17] SEC v. Jarkesy, No. 22-859, Supreme Court, June 27, 2024.
Seventh Amendment and punitive civil enforcement; relied upon for court-based design, not an overbroad universal rule.
Official source: www.supremecourt.gov
[18] Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, No. 19-251, Supreme Court, July 1, 2021.
Associational disclosure, tailoring, and donor privacy.
Official source: www.supremecourt.gov
[19] National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, No. 22-842, Supreme Court, May 30, 2024.
Government coercion of private intermediaries; procedural posture does not establish every allegation as proved.
Official source: www.supremecourt.gov
[20] Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transnational repression.
Threat categories, reporting, and victim-protection context.
Official source: www.fbi.gov
[21] TikTok Inc. v. Garland, Nos. 24-656 and 24-657, Supreme Court, January 17, 2025.
Specific foreign-control statute and evidentiary record; not blanket authority to suppress foreign-associated expression.
Official source: www.supremecourt.gov
[22] United Kingdom Home Office, Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: political-influence tier guidance.
Comparative registration design; not transposed as United States authority.
Official source: www.gov.uk
10. Quality-Check
Consistency. The bill contains 20 titles and 206 unique sections, a generated contents schedule, common definitions, assigned agency roles, separate civil and criminal standards, and coordinated effective dates. Internal cross-references and appropriation arithmetic were checked. Introduction-stage counsel should repeat the checks against the then-current United States Code and any intervening enactments.
Authority. Federal nexuses and enumerated powers are stated; existing exclusive review forums and constitutional institutions are preserved. State and Tribal participation is voluntary. The bill does not assume an unlimited national foreign-influence police power.
Constitutional risk. Speech, association, equal protection, due process, jury rights, property, privacy, federalism, and immunity risks are addressed but not eliminated. Ballot-measure spending, disclosure scope, cooling-off duration, secrecy, and sanctions applications warrant especially close review.
Enforceability. Duties identify regulated conduct, responsible agencies, timing, mental states, evidence standards, remedies, and review. New criminal liability is express. The practical obstacles of attribution, overseas evidence, noncooperative states, and limited extradition remain real.
Fiscal assumptions. $600 million startup plus $3 billion annually for ten program fiscal years equals $30.6 billion in direct budget authority. Amounts are nominal, not inflation-indexed. No CBO certification, outlay estimate, offset, guaranteed saving, or revenue-financing claim is made.
Implementation risk. Major risks are hiring, registry security, interagency handoffs, false positives, parallel reporting, small-entity burden, scientific effects, and private overcompliance. The draft funds assistance and oversight, preserves phased commencement, and requires independent evaluation.
Open questions. Before introduction, complete a current-law update; formal budget score; full state-law and treaty concordance; empirical testing of thresholds and cooling-off duration; estimates of agency and court workload; and structured consultation with victims, regulated entities, States, Tribes, scientific institutions, and civil-liberties experts. No claim is made that every loophole is closed or that litigation risk is zero.